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RÉSUMÉ 
 
 Contrairement à une certaine idée reçue, nous montrons que l'ouverture du 
marché domestique par l'abolition d'un tarif douanier ne va pas nécessairement rendre 
moins profitable les fusions domestiques. Cette idée suppose implicitement que le tarif 
en question est prohibitif avant son abolition et qu'il le demeure après une fusion. Or ce 
n'est souvent pas le cas. Nous montrons, à l'aide d'un exemple, que l'abolition du tarif 
pourrait, dans certains cas, rendre la fusion domestique plus profitable. 
 
Mots clés : fusions, lois sur la concurrence, libéralisation du commerce 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
It is often thought that a tariff reduction, by opening up the domestic market to 
foreign firms, should lessen the need for a policy aimed at discouraging domestic 
mergers. This implicitly assumes that the tariff in question is sufficiently high to prevent 
foreign firms from selling in the domestic market. However, not all tariffs are prohibitive, 
so that foreign firms may be present in the domestic market before it is abolished. 
Furthermore, even if the tariff is prohibitive, a merger of domestic firms may render it 
nonprohibitive, thus inviting foreign firms to penetrate the domestic market. In this 
paper, we show, using a simple example, that in the latter two cases, abolishing the 
tariff may in fact make the domestic merger more profitable. Hence, trade liberalization 
will not necessarily reduce the profitability of domestic mergers. 
 
Key words :  mergers, antitrust, free trade 
 
 
1 Introduction
It is often thought that tariﬀ reduction should lessen the need for a policy aimed at discour-
aging domestic mergers. The reasoning is that the abolition of a tariﬀ on imports would
encourage foreign ﬁrms to enter, thereby increasing the number of ﬁrms serving the domes-
tic market. Since the merger of a subset of ﬁrms in an oligopolistic Cournot equilibrium is
proﬁtable only if the number of ﬁrms in the subset is suﬃciently large relative to the num-
ber ﬁrms in the industry (see Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds, 1983, and Gaudet and Salant,
1991), increasing the number of ﬁrms in the domestic market will make it less likely that the
merger is proﬁtable and, presumably, less likely that it would occur.1
The above argumentation implicitly rests on the assumption that the tariﬀ in question is
suﬃciently high to prevent foreign ﬁrms from selling in the domestic market. However, not
all tariﬀs are prohibitive. Hence foreign ﬁrms may be present in the domestic market before
it is abolished. Furthermore, even if the tariﬀ is prohibitive, a merger of domestics ﬁrms may
render it non prohibitive, thus inviting foreign ﬁrms to penetrate the domestic market. We
show in this paper, using a simple linear demand and zero marginal cost example, that in the
later two cases, abolishing the tariﬀ may in fact make the domestic merger more proﬁtable.
A number of authors have in the past studied various normative or positive issues related
to mergers in a multi-country context. Some have looked at the welfare eﬀects of interna-
tional (i.e., cross-border) mergers or its comparison with the eﬀect of national mergers (for
instance Barros and Cabral 1994, Falvey, 1998, Kabiraj and Chaudhuri, 1999), while others
have stressed the interaction of competition policy and optimal trade policy in the context
of oligopolistic competition (for instance Collie, 2000 and Horn and Levinsohn, 1997). This
paper is more closely related to those that consider explicitly the eﬀect of tariﬀ reductions
on potential merger behavior of the ﬁrms. This is the case in Ross (1988), Falvey (1998) and
Long and Vousden (1995). Ross analyzed the eﬀect of a tariﬀ reduction on the anticompeti-
1For an analysis of the endogenous decision to merge, see Kamien and Zang, 1991, and Gaudet and
Salant, 1992.
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tive consequences, or price raising properties, of a reduction in the number of ﬁrms through
merger. He models both a domestic dominant oligopoly and an international oligopoly and
ﬁnds that in some cases a lower tariﬀ serves to restrain price increases subsequent to a merger
and in other cases it does not. In particular, he concludes that in an international oligopoly
context, a unilateral tariﬀ reduction should tend to discourage mergers between domestic
ﬁrms and encourage them between foreign ﬁrms serving the domestic market. Falvey (1998)
discusses various implications of trade liberalisation for the proﬁtability of mergers. One of
his ﬁndings is that trade liberalisation is likely to generate merger activity between ﬁrms in
the previously protected market. Long and Vousden (1995) also arrive at the conclusion that
a unilateral tariﬀ reduction will tend to increase the incentive to merge between domestic
ﬁrms, but show that the eﬀect on the gain from merging depends on the size of the savings
in marginal costs which results from the merger2.
Each of those last three papers has looked at the eﬀects of a marginal variation in the
tariﬀ and hence cannot completely answer the problem addressed here. The question we pose
requires that we consider the eﬀect of a non marginal change in the tariﬀ, i.e., its abolition.
This involves comparing the equilibria that occur before and after the abolition of the tariﬀ.
A by-product of our analysis is that it may also serve to illustrate the fact that the eﬀect
of the marginal variation in the tariﬀ is likely to depend on the level of the tariﬀ at which
these variations are evaluated.
In section 2, we brieﬂy describe the model and its equilibrium. In section 3, we compare
the proﬁtability of a merger in equilibrium with and without the tariﬀ, for diﬀerent levels of
the tariﬀ. Brief concluding remarks follow in section 4.
2It is interesting to note their ﬁnding that if the savings in marginal costs involved is small, or zero as in
the example considered here, then the gains from merging are negative. This is an illustration of the well
known result of Salant Switzer and Reynolds (1983). Of course if the gains from merging are negative, then
logically a marginal change in the tariﬀ should have no eﬀect on the incentive to merge.
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2 The model
Let Pd and Pf denote the market price on the domestic and on the foreign (rest of the
world) markets respectively and let Qd and Qf denote the corresponding aggregate quantities
on each market. The linear inverse demand functions will be denoted Pd = β − Qd and
Pf = b −Qf . We will assume that three ﬁrms produce the homogeneous good: one foreign
ﬁrm (ﬁrm 0) and two domestic ﬁrms (ﬁrms 1 and 2). This means that Qj =
∑
i q
j
i , i = 0, 1, 2,
j = d, f , where qdi and q
f
i denote the sales of ﬁrm i, i = 1, 2, in the domestic and foreign
markets respectively. For simplicity, we assume that there are no variable costs of production
and no transport costs. The per unit tariﬀ imposed on the exports of the foreign ﬁrm to the
domestic market will be denoted t (t ≥ 0).
The proﬁts of the ﬁrms are then
π0 =
(
b−Qf
)
qf0 +
(
β −Qd
)
qd0 − tqd0 (1)
π1 =
(
β −Qd
)
qd1 +
(
b−Qf
)
qf1 (2)
π2 =
(
β −Qd
)
qd2 +
(
b−Qf
)
qf2 . (3)
and the unique Cournot equilibrium is given by
qf0 = q
f
1 = q
f
2 = q
f =
b
4
, Qf =
3b
4
(4)
and
qd1 = q
d
2 = q
d =
β + t
4
, qd0 =
β − 3t
4
, Qd =
3β − t
4
. (5)
We will assume interior solutions for all quantities except possibly qd0 , which may be zero if
t is prohibitively high. This will be the case if t ≥ β
3
. Otherwise, if 0 ≤ t < β
3
, all three ﬁrms
sell on both markets.
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If the tariﬀ is prohibitive, the equilibrium proﬁts are
π1 = π2 = π
d =
β2
9
+
b2
16
, π0 =
b2
16
. (6)
Otherwise, with all three ﬁrms present on both markets, they are
π1 = π2 = π
d =
(β + t)2
16
+
b2
16
, π0 =
(β + t) (β − 3t)
16
+
β
16
. (7)
Suppose now that the two domestic ﬁrms merge and let qdm and q
f
m denote the sales of the
merged ﬁrm in the domestic and foreign markets respectively. The equilibrium quantities
are then given by
qfm = q
f
0 =
b
3
, Qf =
2b
3
(8)
and
qdm =
β + t
3
, qd0 =
β − 2t
3
, Qd =
2β − t
3
. (9)
After the merger, the tariﬀ therefore becomes prohibitive whenever t ≥ β
2
. Otherwise, if
0 ≤ t < β
2
, the two ﬁrms are present on each market.
Whenever the tariﬀ is prohibitive, the equilibrium proﬁts will now be
πm =
β2
4
+
b2
9
, π0 =
b2
9
, (10)
whereas if both ﬁrms are present on each market, they are
πm =
(β + t)2
9
+
b2
9
, π0 =
(β + t) (β − 2t)
9
+
b2
9
. (11)
We have so far assumed that there are no ﬁxed costs. It is well known from Salant, Switzer
and Reynolds (1983), and it can be easily veriﬁed from the above, that in the absence of
ﬁxed costs, the merger just described is not proﬁtable. However, it will become proﬁtable
if suﬃcient ﬁxed cost is avoided by merging. Assume then that each ﬁrm faces an identical
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ﬁxed cost of F > 0 and, following Gaudet and Salant (1992), let θ denote the threshold level
of this ﬁxed cost which would make the merger just proﬁtable. The value of θ is given by
πm − θ = 2 (πd − θ) . (12)
By the deﬁnition of θ, the merger will be strictly proﬁtable if and only F > θ. In this sense,
any intervention that increases θ renders the merger less proﬁtable. In the case at hand, the
value of θ will depend on t.
The preceeding analysis suggests that it is useful to distinguish four cases, along with
the corresponding values for the threshold level of ﬁxed cost:
Case 1 t = 0, in which case the threshold level is θ1 =
β2
72
+ b
2
72
,
Case 2 0 < t < β
3
, in which case the threshold level is θ2 =
(β+t)2
72
+ b
2
72
,
Case 3 β
3
≤ t < β
2
, in which case the threshold level is θ3 =
2β2−(β+t)2
9
+ b
2
72
,
Case 4 β
2
≤ t, in which case the threshold level is θ4 = −β236 + b
2
72
.
Case 1 represents the free trade reference case. In Case 2, the tariﬀ is positive, but not
suﬃciently so to be prohibitive. In Case 3, the tariﬀ is prohibitive before the merger, but
not after the merger. In Case 4, the tariﬀ is prohibitive both before and after the merger.
This is illustrated in Figure 1, which depicts, θ, the threshold level of ﬁxed cost as a function
of the tariﬀ. The ﬁgure is drawn with values of the parameters set at β = b = 1 for illustrative
purposes3. Notice that θ4 is always smaller than θ1, independent of the values of β and b,
but it is not necessarily negative — it will be positive if the slope of the demand curve in
the foreign market (b) is suﬃciently larger than that in the domestic market (β).
3The strict convexity of the segment θ2 and the strict concavity of the segment θ3 is only slightly apparent
on the graph because of scale eﬀects, but it is real.
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Figure 1: Fixed Costs Profitability Threshold as a Function of the Tariff
θ
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3 The eﬀect of removing the tariﬀ
The question we now want to ask is whether abolishing the tariﬀ will render the merger more
or less proﬁtable. We do this by comparing the threshold levels for each of Cases 2, 3 and 4
to that in Case 1. If, for some i = 2, 3, 4, θi > (<)θ1, then, in that case, the merger has to
save a larger (smaller) amount of ﬁxed costs than under free trade in order to be proﬁtable,
which means that abolishing the tariﬀ makes the merger more (less) proﬁtable.
3.1 The tariﬀ is not prohibitive
When the tariﬀ is not prohibitive to begin with (Case 2), we verify that
θ1 − θ2 = β
2 − (β + t)2
72
< 0.
This means that the cost saving required for the merger to be just proﬁtable in the presence
of the tariﬀ is greater than under free trade: paradoxically, trade liberalization increases
the proﬁtablity of the merger. The reason why this can occur is quite simple. Although
abolishing the tariﬀ reduces the joint proﬁts (gross of ﬁxed cost) of the domestic ﬁrms
whether they are merged or not, it reduces it less if the two ﬁrms are merged than if they
are not.
Notice that it is perfectly possible for an unproﬁtable merger to become proﬁtable after
trade liberalization. This is the case when θ1 < F < θ2.
3.2 The tariﬀ is not prohibitive only if the ﬁrms are merged
In Case 3, the tariﬀ is prohibitive when the domestic ﬁrms are not merged, but not otherwise.
The reason is that, given the tariﬀ, turning a monopoly on the domestic market into an
asymmetric duopoly is attractive to the foreign ﬁrm, but turning a symmetric duopoly into
an asymmetric triopoly is not.
7
In this case, the diﬀerence in the threshold levels of ﬁxed costs is given by
θ1 − θ3 = β
2
72
− 2β
2 − (β + t)2
9
,
and we verify that4
θ1 − θ3 =


< 0 if
β
3
≤ t < β
(√
30
4
− 1
)
= 0 if t = β
(√
30
4
− 1
)
> 0 if β
(√
30
4
− 1
)
< t <
β
2
Therefore the merger may be more proﬁtable under free trade in this case as well, provided
the tariﬀ is not too high. This will occur if β/3 < t < β
(√
30/4− 1
)
. However, for a
suﬃciently high tariﬀ (β
(√
30/4− 1
)
< t < β/2), abolishing it will make the merger less
proﬁtable. This is because, for t < (>) β
(√
30/4− 1
)
, the loss in joint proﬁts to the
domestic ﬁrms which results from abolishing the tariﬀ is greater (smaller) if they are not
merged than if they are, and is exactly equal if t = β
(√
30/4− 1
)
.
3.3 The tariﬀ is prohibitive whether the ﬁrms are merged or not
Finally, the tariﬀ may be so high that it is prohibitive whether the domestic ﬁrms are merged
or not. This is Case 4, for which
θ1 − θ4 = β
2
24
> 0.
In this case, trade liberalization always reduces the proﬁtability of the domestic merger.
In fact, if θ4 is negative, then the merger is proﬁtable even in the absence of ﬁxed costs,
something which is not possible when there is no tariﬀ, as θ1 is always positive.
5 This occurs
4There is a second root to θ1 − θ3 = 0, which we neglect, since it is negative.
5The fact that θ1 is positive is a simple illustration of the result of Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983)
that, in a Cournot equilibrium with linear demand, linear costs and no ﬁxed costs, a merger which includes
8
when β2 > b2/2, which means that the domestic market is suﬃciently more important than
the foreign market.
4 Concluding remarks
Some of the quantitative results obtained clearly depend on the simplifying assumptions of
linearity and on the fact that the number of domestic ﬁrms is twice the number of foreign
ﬁrms. Those simplifying assumptions were made only to facilitate the demonstration that
the argument that trade liberalization reduces the proﬁtability of domestics mergers is not a
clear cut one: it depends on the level of the tariﬀ that is being abolished. The demonstration
can easily be extended to more general assumptions on the demand and costs functions and
on the number of ﬁrms.
less than eighty percent of the ﬁrms is not proﬁtable.
9
References
Barros, Pedro P. and Luis M.B. Cabral, “Merger Policy in Open Economies”, European
Economic Review 38(1994): 1041–1055.
Collie, David R., “Mergers and Trade Policy under Oligopoly”, Review of International
Economics (2000): forthcoming.
Falvey, Rodney, “Mergers in Open Economies”, The World Economy 21(1998):1061–1076.
Gaudet, Ge´rard and Stephen W. Salant, “Increasing the Proﬁts of a Subset of Firms in
Oligopoly Models with Strategic Substitutes”, American Economic Review 81(1991): 658–
665.
Gaudet, Ge´rard and Stephen W. Salant, “Towards a Theory of Horizontal Mergers”, in
George Norman and Manfredi La Manna (eds.), The New Industrial Economics: Recent
Developments in Industrial Organisation, Oligopoly and Game Theory, Aldershot,England:
Edward Elgar Publishing, 1992, pp. 137–58.
Horn, Henrik and James Levinsohn,Merger Policy and Trade Liberalization, National Bureau
of Economic Research Working Paper No. 6077, 1997.
Kabiraj, Tarun and Manas Chaudhuri, “On the Welfare Analysis of a Cross-Border Merger”,
The Journal of International Trade and Economic Development 8(1999): 195–207.
Kamien, Morton I. and Isreal Zang, “The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 105(1990): 465–500.
Long, Ngo Van and Neil J. Vousden, “The Eﬀects of trade Liberalisation on Cost-Reducing
Horizontal Mergers”, Review of International Economics 3(1995): 141–155.
Ross, Thomas W., “On the Price eﬀects of Mergers with Freer Trade”, International Journal
of Industrial Organization 6(1998): 233–246.
Salant, Stephen W., Sheldon Switzer and Robert J. Reynolds, “Losses from Horizontal
Merger: The Eﬀects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equi-
librium”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(1983): 185–200.
10
